The Status of Divorced Daughter for the purpose of Compassionate Appointment

#Service Matters #Judiciary #Judgment #SupremeCourt #DivorcedDaughters

The Director of Treasuries  in Karnataka & Anr.  vs   V. Somyashree

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5122 OF 2021: 13-Sep-2021

Bench:  M. R. SHAH and ANIRUDDHA BOSE

Issue- Whether divorced daughter will be considered on par with ‘unmarried’     or ‘widowed daughter’ for the purpose of compassionate   appointment?

The law laid down by Supreme Court in N. C. Santosh vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 617 on grant of appointment on compassionate ground can be summarized as under: 

• that   the   compassionate   appointment   is   an exception to the general rule;

• that   no   aspirant   has   a   right   to   compassionate appointment;

• the appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on   the   basis   of   the principle in accordance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India;

• appointment   on   compassionate   ground   can   be made only on fulfilling the norms laid down by the State’s policy and/or satisfaction State’s policy and/or satisfaction of the   per the policy;

• the   norms   prevailing   on   the   date   of   the consideration of the application should be the basis for   consideration   of   claim for   compassionate appointment.

The word ‘divorced daughter’ has   been   added   subsequently   by Amendment, 2021 in the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996. Therefore, at the relevant time when the deceased employee died and when the original writ petitioner – respondent herein made   an   application   for appointment on compassionate ground the ‘divorced   daughter’   were   not eligible for appointment   on   compassionate   ground   and   the ‘divorced daughter’ was not within the definition of ‘dependent.’

It is to be noted that the deceased employee died on 25.03.2012. The Respondent herein-original writ petitioner at that time was a married daughter. Her marriage was subsisting on the date of the death of the deceased i.e., on 25.03.2012.  Immediately on the date of the death of the deceased employee, the respondent initiated the divorce proceedings under Section   13B   of   the   Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 12.09.2012 for       decree of divorce by mutual consent.  By Judgment dated 20.03.2013, the   Learned Principal Civil Judge, Mandya granted the decree of divorce by mutual consent.  That immediately on the very next day i.e., on 21.03.2013, the respondent herein on the basis of the decree of divorce   by   mutual consent     applied   for   appointment   on compassionate ground.

The aforesaid   chronology of dates and events would suggest   that only   for the purpose of   getting appointment on compassionate ground the decree of divorce by mutual consent has been obtained.  

Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that at the time when the deceased  employee died on 25.03.2012 the marriage between   the   respondent and   her   husband   was   subsisting. Therefore, at the time when the deceased employee died she was a married daughter and therefore, also cannot be said to be ‘dependent’ as defined under Rule 2 of the Rules 1996.

Therefore, even if it is assumed that the ‘divorced daughter’  may   fall   in   the  same   class   of ‘unmarried   daughter’ and ‘widowed daughter’ in that case also the date on which the deceased employee died she – respondent herein    was not the divorced daughter’ as she obtained the divorce by mutual consent subsequent to the death of the deceased employee.

Source: https://main.sci.gov.in/

Misconception and misunderstanding of Section 170, Cr.P.C

Aman Preet Singh   vs   CBI through Director  

Criminal Appeal No 929 of 2021 arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5234 of 2021: 02-Sep-2021

Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M M Sundresh

Issue- 1. Section 170, Cr.P.C

          2. Arrest and Chargesheet

This is one more case based on a misconception and misunderstanding of Section 170, Cr.P.C.!

The Supreme Court observed that the purport of Section 170, Cr.P.C. should no more be in doubt in view of the recent judgment in Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 838/2021),2021 SCC onLine SC 615).

The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Court on its own Motion vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2004) 72 DRJ 629 have received the imprimatur of Supreme Court. Para 26 of the Judgment says:

“26. Arrest of a person for less serious or such kinds of offence or offences those can be investigated without arrest by the police cannot be brooked by any civilized society. Directions for Criminal Courts :

• Whenever officer-in-charge of police station or Investigating Agency like CBI files a charge-sheet without arresting the accused during investigation and does not produce the accused in custody as referred in Section 170, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate or the Court empowered to take cognizance or try the accused shall accept the charge-sheet forthwith and proceed according to the procedure laid down in Section 173, Cr.P.C. and exercise 6 the options available to it as discussed in this judgment. In such a case the Magistrate or Court shall invariably issue a process of summons and not warrant of arrest.
• In case the Court or Magistrate exercises the discretion of issuing warrant of arrest at any stage including the stage while taking cognizance of the charge-sheet, he or it shall have to record the reasons in writing as contemplated under Section 87, Cr.P.C. that the accused has either been absconding or shall not obey the summons or has refused to appear despite proof of due service of summons upon him.
• Rejection of an application for exemption from personal appearance on any date of hearing or even at first instance does not amount to nonappearance despite service of summons or absconding or failure to obey summons and the Court in such a case shall not issue warrant of arrest and may either give direction to the accused to appear or issue process of summons.
• That the Court shall on appearance of an accused in a bailable offence release him forthwith on his furnishing a personal bond with or without sureties as per the mandatory provisions of Section 436, Cr.P.C.
• The Court shall on appearance of an accused in non-bailable offence who has neither been arrested by the police/Investigating Agency during investigation nor produced in custody as envisaged in Section 170, Cr.P.C. call upon the accused to move a bail application if the accused does not move it on his own and release him on bail as the circumstance of his having not been arrested during investigation or not being produced in custody is itself sufficient to entitle him to be released on bail. Reason is simple. If a person has been at large and free for several years and has not been even arrested during investigation, to 7 send him to jail by refusing bail suddenly, merely because charge-sheet has been filed is against the basic principles governing grant or refusal of bail. xxxxxxxxxx”

A reading of the aforesaid shows that it is the guiding principle for a Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 170, Cr.P.C. which had been set out. The Magistrate or the Court empowered to take cognizance or try the accused has to accept the charge sheet forthwith and proceed in accordance with the procedure laid down under Section 173, Cr.P.C. It has been rightly observed that in such a case the Magistrate or the Court is required to invariably issue a process of summons and not warrant of arrest. In case he seeks to exercise the discretion of issuing warrants of arrest, he is required to record the reasons as contemplated under Section 87, Cr.P.C. that the accused has either been absconding or shall not obey the summons or has refused to appear despite proof of due service of summons upon him.

In fact the observations in Sub-para (iii) above by the High Court are in the nature of caution. Insofar as the present case is concerned and the general principles under Section 170 Cr.P.C., the most apposite observations are in sub-para (v) of the High Court judgment in the context of an accused in a non-bailable offence whose custody was not required during the period of investigation. In such a scenario, it is appropriate that the accused is released on bail as the circumstances of his having not been arrested during investigation or not being produced in custody is itself sufficient to entitle him to be released on bail.

The rationale has been succinctly set out that if a person has been enlarged and free for many years and has not even been arrested during investigation, to suddenly direct his arrest and to be incarcerated merely because charge sheet has been filed would be contrary to the governing principles for grant of bail. The Supreme Court further said that the observation hereinabove would supplement observations made in Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(supra) and must be read together with that judgment.

Earlier, the Supreme Court in Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 838/2021),2021 SCC onLine SC 615) observed:

“We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. that it does not impose an obligation on the Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet.

We have, in fact, come across cases where the accused has cooperated with the investigation throughout and yet on the chargesheet being filed non-bailable warrants have been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court.

We are of the view that if the Investigating Officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons, he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the Investigating Officer before the court while filing the chargesheet.

We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it. If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. If the Investigating Officer has no reason to believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the accused.

We are, in fact, faced with a situation where contrary to the observations in Joginder Kumar’s case how a police officer has to deal with a scenario of arrest, the trial courts are stated to be insisting on the arrest of an accused as a pre-requisite formality to take the chargesheet on record in view of the provisions of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. We consider such a course misplaced and contrary to the very intent of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C.”

Res judicata and Rejection of Plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(d)

Srihari Hanumandas Totala   vs     Hemant Vithal Kamat & Ors  

Civil Appeal No 4665 2021Arising out of SLP (C) No.3899 of 2021: 09-Aug-2021

Bench: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and M R Shah

Issue- 1. Scope of Rejection of Plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(d)

          2. Res judicata

Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC reads as follows:

“11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

[(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;]

[(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:] [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]”

Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC provides that the plaint shall be rejected “where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law”. Hence, in order to decide whether the suit is barred by any law, it is the statement in the plaint which will have to be construed. The Court while deciding such an application must have due regard only to the statements in the plaint. Whether the suit is barred by any law must be determined from the statements in the plaint and it is not open to decide the issue on the basis of any other material including the written statement in the case.

Section 11 of CPC defines res judicata:

“11. Res judicata. —No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

The Court referred to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court to identify the stand taken by it in the application of the res judicata. Justice R C Lahoti (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for a two Judge bench in V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava discussed the plea of res judicata and the particulars that would be required to prove the plea. The court held that it is necessary to refer to the copies of the pleadings, issues and the judgment of the ‘former suit’ while adjudicating on the plea of res judicata:

“11. The rule of res judicata does not strike at the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the subsequent suit. It is a rule of estoppel by judgment based on the public policy that there should be a finality to litigation and no one should be vexed twice for the same cause. 13. Not only the plea has to be taken, it has to be substantiated by producing the copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. Maybe, in a given case only copy of judgment in previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa [(1976) 4 SCC 780] the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata. It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [AIR 1964 SC 1810 : (1964) 7 SCR 831] placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secy. Of State for India in Council [(1887-88) 15 IA 186 : ILR 16 Cal 173] pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issue in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say, these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.”

Finally, the Court summarised the guiding principles for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) as follows:

• To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to;
• The defense made by the defendant in the suit must not be considered while deciding the merits of the application;
• To determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it is necessary that (i) the ‘previous suit’ is decided, (ii) the issues in the subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (iii) the former suit was between the same parties or parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title; and (iv) that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by a court competent to try the subsequent suit; and
• Since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the ‘previous suit’, such a plea will be 20 beyond the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), where only the statements in the plaint will have to be perused.

The State of Kerala v K. Ajith  

Crl.A. No. 697/2021 – D.No. 11510 / 2021. DOJ: 28-Jul-2021

Bench: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and M R Shah

Issue- 1. The exercise of power by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321.

2. The exercise of PART C 14 jurisdiction by the CJM. Before assessing the submissions of the parties.

Section 321 of the CrPC : Withdrawal from prosecution. The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal,-

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences;

(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences:

Provided that where such offence-

(i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, or

(ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946 ), or

(iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or

(iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,

and the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution.

The locus classicus on the interpretation of the powers conferred by Section 321 of the CrPC is the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar & Ors (1987) 1 SCC 288.

…… All that the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The court after considering these facets of the case, will have to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given……. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.”…………….. it is not the duty of this Court, in an application under Section 321 of the CrPC, to adjudicate upon evidentiary issues and examine the admissibility or sufficiency of evidence……..

The Supreme Court has formulated following principles on the withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 321 of the CrPC which are as follows:

• Section 321 entrusts the decision to withdraw from a prosecution to the public prosecutor but the consent of the court is required for a withdrawal of the prosecution;
• The public prosecutor may withdraw from a prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also to further the broad ends of public justice;
• The public prosecutor must formulate an independent opinion before seeking the consent of the court to withdraw from the prosecution;
• While the mere fact that the initiative has come from the government will not vitiate an application for withdrawal, the court must make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal so as to ensure that the public prosecutor was satisfied that the withdrawal of the prosecution is necessary for good and relevant reasons;
• In deciding whether to grant its consent to a withdrawal, the court exercises a judicial function but it has been described to be supervisory in nature. Before deciding whether to grant its consent the court must be satisfied that:

(a) The function of the public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes;

(b) The application has been made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice, and not to thwart or stifle the process of law;

(c) The application does not suffer from such improprieties or illegalities as would cause manifest injustice if consent were to be given;

(d) The grant of consent sub-serves the administration of justice; and

(e) The permission has not been sought with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the public prosecutor is duty bound to maintain;

• While determining whether the withdrawal of the prosecution subserves the administration of justice, the court would be justified in scrutinizing the nature and gravity of the offence and its impact upon public life especially where matters involving public funds and the discharge of a public trust are implicated; and
• In a situation where both the trial judge and the revisional court have concurred in granting or refusing consent, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would exercise caution before disturbing concurrent findings. The Court may in exercise of the well-settled principles attached to the exercise of this jurisdiction, interfere in a case where there has been a failure of the trial judge or of the High Court to apply the correct principles in deciding whether to grant or withhold consent.

CIVILSERVICES #UPSC #INDIANPOLITY #GOVERNANCE #LATESTBOOK #CONSTITUTION #JUDGMENTS

Constitutionality of 97^th Constitution Amendment Act

Union of India v Rajendran N Shah

C.A. No. 9108-9109/2014 – D.No. 21321 / 2013 20-Jul-2021

Bench: R. F. Nariman, B. R. Gavai (Majority judgment) and K. M. Joseph (Minority Judgment)

Issues

1. Constitutionality of 97^th Constitution Amendment Act
2. Doctrine of Severability
3. Constituent power vs Legislative power
4. Article 368 of the Constitution of India

Parliament’s ‘constituent power’ referred to in Article 368(1)

Though an amendment of the Constitution is the exercise of constituent power which differs from ordinary legislative power, such constituent power does not convert Parliament into an original constituent assembly. Parliament being the donee of a limited power may only exercise such power in accordance with both the procedural and substantive limitations contained in the Constitution of India. The procedural limitations are contained in Article 368(2).

A challenge to a constitutional amendment may, be on procedural or substantive grounds. The present case concerns itself with the procedural ground contained in Article 368(2) proviso.

The “change” spoken about by Article 368 (2) proviso in any provision of the Constitution need not be direct in the sense of adding, subtracting, or modifying the language of the particular Article or provision spoken of in the proviso. The judgments above referred to speak of a ‘change-in effect’ which would mean a change which, though not in the language of any provision of the Constitution, would yet be a change which would impact a particular article and the principle contained therein in some significant way.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that Article 246(3) read with List II of the 7^th  Schedule of the Constitution of India reflects an important constitutional principle that can be said to form part of the basic structure of the Constitution, namely, the fact that the Constitution is not unitary but quasi-federal in character. The question that arises before us is as to whether this principle can be said to have been infracted by inserting Part IXB into the Constitution of India so that the States’ legislative powers contained in Article 246(3) read with Entry 32 List II of the 7^th Schedule can be said to have been affected in a significant manner.

It is always important to remember that in matters affecting the Constitution of India, form always gives way to substance. There can be no manner of doubt that had exceptions been provided in Entry 32 List II itself, such amendment to Entry 32 List II would require ratification. There can also be no doubt that in effect if the subject matter “co-operative societies” had been either expanded or curtailed by adding a definition clause in Article 366 of the Constitution of India, such expansion or curtailment would also require ratification as significant changes have been made in effect in Entry 32 List II of the Constitution of India. Likewise, if a separate part is added in the Constitution of India, the direct effect of adding such part being to curtail the width of Entry 32 List II in a significant manner, again, in effect Entry 32 List II is directly impacted, again requiring ratification. It is of no moment that one method is chosen or preferred to another so long as Entry 32 List II is curtailed either by adding or deleting words in Entry 32 itself or by doing so through an indirect methodology, namely, adding a new definition clause in Article 366 or adding a new part to the Constitution of India.

The analysis of Part IXB of the Constitution of India, as inserted by the Constitution 97^th Amendment Act

…… it is clear that the exclusive legislative power that is contained in Entry 32 List II has been significantly and substantially impacted in that such exclusive power is now subjected to a large number of curtailments. Indeed, Article 243ZI specifically mandates that the exclusive legislative power contained in Entry 32 List II of the State Legislature is now severely curtailed as it can only be exercised subject to the provisions of Part IXB; and further, Article 243ZT makes it clear that all State laws which do not conform to the restrictions mentioned in Part IXB automatically come to an end on the expiration of one year from the commencement of the Constitution 97^th Amendment Act.

The aforesaid analysis of Part IXB of the Constitution leads to the result that though Article 246(3) and Entry 32, List II of the 7^th Schedule have not been ‘changed’ in letter, yet the impact upon the aforesaid articles cannot be said to be insignificant. On the contrary, it is clear that by curtailing the width of Entry 32, List II of the 7^th Schedule, Part IXB seeks to effect a significant change in Article 246(3) read with Entry 32 List II of the 7^th Schedule inasmuch as the State’s exclusive power to make laws with regard to the subject of co-operative societies is significantly curtailed thereby directly impacting the quasi-federal principle contained therein. Quite clearly, therefore, Part IXB, insofar as it applies to co-operative societies which operate within a State, would therefore require ratification under both sub-clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution of India.

Example

It is interesting to note that Part IX of the Constitution of India which was inserted into the Constitution by the Constitution (73^rd Amendment) Act, 1992 and Part IXA inserted into the Constitution by the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 made similar provisions qua Panchayats and Municipalities. Entry 5 of List II, 7^th Schedule………Both the Constitution 73^rd and 74^th Amendments were sent for ratification and were ratified by Legislatures of more than half the States.

No Substantive challenge to Part IXB

We reiterate that our judgment is confined to the procedural aspect of Article 368(2) proviso, there being no substantive challenge to Part IXB on the ground that it violates the basic structure doctrine as laid down in Kesavananda Bharati’s case (supra).

Scheme qua multi-State cooperative societies and Doctrine of Severebility

The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Constitution 97^th Amendment Act makes this clear. It states:

“The proposed new Part in the Constitution, inter alia, seeks to empower the Parliament in respect of multi-State cooperative societies and the State Legislatures in cases of other co-operative societies to make appropriate law, laying down the following matters, namely:” (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear, therefore, that the Scheme qua multi-State cooperative societies is separate from the Scheme dealing with “other cooperative societies”, Parliament being empowered, so far as multi-State cooperative societies are concerned, and the State legislatures having to make appropriate laws laying down certain matters so far as “other cooperative societies” are concerned. The effect of Article 246ZR is as if multi-State co-operative societies are separately dealt with in a separate sub-chapter contained within Part IXB, as is correctly contended by the learned Attorney General. Also, there is no doubt that after severance what survives can and does stand independently and is workable……………. This being the case, we declare that Part IXB of the Constitution of India is operative insofar as multi-State co-operative societies are concerned.

The judgment of the High Court is upheld except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution of India. As held by us above, it is declared that Part IXB of the Constitution of India is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-State cooperative societies both within the various States and in the Union territories of India.

Case: Bhagwanrao Mahadeo Patil Vs. Appa Ramchandra Savkar [CrA 601 OF 2021]

Judges: Justice Vineet Saran and Dinesh Maheshwari 

The Supreme Court reiterated that an accused cannot be discharged for an offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code while confirming the charge under Section 304B IPC. 

It relied on Bhupendra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh – (2014) 2 SCC 106 and quoted

“30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 306 IPC is much broader in its application and takes within its fold one aspect of Section 304B IPC, it will necessarily attract Section 306 IPC. However, the converse is not true.”

Finally, while allowing the appeal it observed ‘Having heard learned counsel parties, considering the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we are of the opinion that respondents no.1 and 2 ought not to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306 IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC and other related sections had already been framed and confirmed.’